This past year the Institute for Future Conflict launched its first annual essay contest, open to undergraduate students at Colorado State University, CU Boulder, Denver University, the United States Air Force Academy, and University of Colorado-Colorado Springs.
The prompt asked students and cadets: Explain what – if any – actions the United States could have taken, beginning in July 2021, that would have successfully deterred Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Over the next few weeks we are proud to publish the four winners of the contest.
In February 2022, Vladimir Putin made the decision to invade Ukraine. This decision relied on risk calculus, historical precedent, and the actions of the United States. The United States failed to deter Russia in three ways: it limited Ukraine’s capability to respond to Russian encroachment; it was reluctant to follow through on its own threats; and it communicated to Russia in word and deed that Ukraine’s defense was not a high-level US priority.
To successfully deter Russia, the United States should have increased its funding and supply of weapons to Ukraine. It should have de-classified intelligence of Russian aggression to signal U.S. support and develop specific Ukrainian capability to resist. Finally, rather than waiting for invasion, the United States should have threatened severe sanctions on key aspects of Russia’s civilian sector. All these actions would have simultaneously increased Ukraine’s defense capabilities while clearly communicating the United States’ intent to actively raise Russia’s cost of invasion. The overall effects would have deterred Russia from invading Ukraine.
Putin adheres to Lenin’s adage, “Probe with bayonets. If you encounter mush, proceed; if you encounter steel, withdraw.” Between July 2021 and February 2022, the United States presented Russia with a “mush” of deterrence half-steps and thus Russia proceeded in February 2022. If the United States hopes to deter future aggression by Russia, China, or other adversaries, it must address its mistakes and choose to meet steel with steel.
Met with Mush: How the US Failed to Deter Russia
Outlined simply, deterrence requires that the United States take or threaten action that raises the perceived costs of invasion above the perceived benefits for Russia. The United States failed to deter Russia’s 2022 invasion because it failed to adequately employ various instruments of national power to fulfill the three elements of deterrence: capability, credibility, and communication.
Capability is a deterrer’s capacity to affect the accomplishment of an aggressor’s objectives. Credibility is the perceived probability that a deterrer will fulfill a threat if an aggressor does not meet its demands. Thus, the strength of a state’s capability typically bolsters its credibility.
To justify the kinds of steel-deterrence actions I am recommending for the United States to implement between July 2021 and the invasion, it is important to have some background on US influence in the region. In 2008, following the Russian invasion of Georgia, the United States chose not to enact sanctions on Russia, and drew down US military presence in Europe despite earlier threats. While these choices were understandable given domestic economic concerns, they weakened the United States’ capability. In 2014, after Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the United States pursued targeted sanctions against Russia, and established multinational NATO deployment initiatives. However, these sanctions were not painful enough to deter Putin and NATO deployments only deterred Russia from action against NATO countries, of which Ukraine is not a member. Overall, actions following Russian aggression after incidents in 2008 and 2014 did little to increase Ukrainian capability or to increase the credibility of the United States to deter future action.
Along with these missed opportunities, consistently low funding and supply of weapons have been another shortcoming across US administrations. For example, President Obama supplied $600 million in military assistance, but none of this aid included weapons. President Trump broke with this decision in 2018 by supplying Javelins, however only 210 were supplied and their use was restricted to training and storage facilities while almost $400 million in security assistance was held up for political reasons. Only in December 2021—when it became clear Putin was planning an invasion—did the US provide an additional $200 million in security assistance. This contributed to a total of $2.7 billion provided between Russia’s 2014 and 2022 encroachments.
To its credit, after Russia’s 2022 invasion, the Biden administration allocated over $180 billion in security assistance, increasing aid to more than 66 times what it was over the previous 7 years. Although this aid has been critical to Ukraine’s success so far, it came too late to deter Russia from invasion. From a Russian perspective, security assistance levels prior to 2022 indicated Ukraine had little capability to resist Russia’s advances and that it was improbable the United States would become as involved in Ukraine’s defense as it did. If the United States had allocated even $3-5 billion for weaponry to aid Ukraine in July of 2021, then it might have deterred Russia’s invasion.
The third element of deterrence, communication, is critical for the success of the other two elements of deterrence. If a state has both the capability and credibility to support its demands but the aggressor misunderstands or is unaware, it is unlikely the aggressor will be deterred.
Across administrations, the United States failed to adequately communicate its capability and credibility to deter Russian aggression towards Ukraine. Comments from President Biden and other officials on multiple occasions painted a picture for Putin that the United States was either unclear of what its role in Ukraine should be or uncommitted to Ukraine’s defense. Furthermore, in the final hours preceding invasion, the United States’ decision to close its embassy in Ukraine and offer to evacuate President Zelensky signaled to the world it believed Ukraine would quickly fall to Russia. This essentially gave Putin the green light.
Overall, the United States failed to increase Ukrainian capability, demonstrate the credibility of its threats, and communicate its intentions to Putin. These failures after 2008, 2014 and prior to 2022 convinced Putin the United States did not plan to show up to the fight, leaving an open path ahead for Russia to conquer Ukraine. With a prior string of deterrence failures, deterring Russia in July 2021 was no easy task. To do so, the U.S. would need to have taken more aggressive action to increase capability and overshadow faltering U.S. credibility in Russia’s eyes.
Forging Steel: Taking Steps to Deter Russia
The United States’ failure to deter Russian aggression across the three elements of deterrence was foreseeable and preventable. Let us return to July 2021. Earlier this spring, Russian troops and equipment massed on the Ukrainian border in their greatest numbers since 2014. United States President Biden offered Ukraine “unwavering support” in the face of Russian aggression. Additionally, President Zelensky has just announced Ukraine’s intention to pursue closer relations with the European Union, riling Russia. At this moment in time, what actions should the United States take to successfully deter a Russian invasion of Ukraine?
First, breaking from previous failures to deter Russia, the United States should immediately increase aid to Ukraine to a figure near $3-5 billion elevating its supply of weaponry. This security assistance should include several thousand Stinger and Javelin systems, one to two dozen Howitzers, a dozen HIMARS and thousands of small arms, all without restrictions on their use in combat beyond existing international law. These actions would sharply contrast with previous actions in the face of Russian aggression, increasing US credibility and Ukrainian capability to raise the costs of invasion above an acceptable level for Russia.
Second, the United States should communicate its willingness to support Ukraine more clearly. Increased security assistance for Ukraine along with weapons is a good start. To supplement this, the United States should assign a General as its Senior Defense Official in the US embassy and send more defense officials and military trainers to Ukraine to engage with their forces, rather than pulling its personnel out.
Third, the United States should use the declassification of intelligence to communicate US commitment and increase Ukraine’s tactical and operational capability in preparation for Russian aggression. In reality, the U.S. approach of declassifying intelligence drew increased awareness to Russia’s preparation for invasion and limited their element of surprise. I recommend a similar declassification, the difference being that beyond increasing global awareness, the intelligence community should specifically prepare Ukraine to defeat a Russian invasion. This would include helping Ukraine use U.S. provided intelligence to develop TTPs and courses of action. This action by the intelligence community would increase Ukraine’s operational capabilities and decrease Russian odds of success.
Finally, America should threaten the use of heavy sanctions to target the civilian populace and key industries required to wage war. Among the most important targets are Russia’s energy sector, and the SWIFT banking system. The resulting internal economic pressure will raise the costs of invasion for Russia, constituting a more effective deterrent.
The Implications of Deterrence
Unfortunately, the United States repeatedly attempted to avoid escalation at the cost of effective deterrence. Had current approaches been undertaken earlier, they would have deterred Russia. Instead, the United States tried to avoid escalatory action, only to be forced into a cycle of continuous escalation after the conflict began.
The United States cannot deter the world’s aggressors without demonstrating a willingness to incur risk. If the United States hopes to successfully deter the threats of tomorrow, it must clearly communicate its capabilities and commitment to raising the costs of aggression for its adversaries. Regardless of the current Trump administration’s push for an end to the conflict in Ukraine, it remains critical that the United States learn why it failed to deter Russia’s invasion in the first place. Ukraine matters – not just for the sake of defending the life and liberty of its people – but because understanding and correcting US deterrence failures is critical to deterring authoritarian ambitions globally, in Eastern Europe, the Indo-Pacific, or wherever America’s next adversary arises.
Brayden Whatcott is a cadet first class at the United States Air Force Academy.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US Air Force, the US Air Force Academy, the Department of War, or the US government.