Emma Campell-Mohn
The character of warfare has changed with the rise of cyber, space, and electronic warfare over the past five years. Artificial intelligence and unmanned aerial vehicales are also shaping conflicts in unexpected ways, leading to new tactics and strategies being deployed in conflict zones. As the United States and its allies and partners confront near-peer rivals, the tactics and capabilities required win conflicts are fundamentally different than in the era of the Global War on Terror or the Cold War.
Yet, amidst these changes, there is another big shift: the importance of global economic networks and their impact on kinetic operations. The distinction between trade and warfare is becoming increasingly fuzzy, as countries utilize economic compellence as part of security strategies and visa versa. This fuzziness has direct implications for kinetic operations. Indeed, one way to describe this phenomenon is “weaponized interdependence” – a term coined by Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman in their article “Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape Coercion.” Farrell and Newman explain how global networks are used for strategic advantage, outlining a new potential threat vector with strong implications for international security.
But what does weaponized interdependence mean for warfare? While there has been significant discussion of economic compellence prior to a conflict (i.e., trade wars), this article examines the implications of weaponized interdependence during warfare.
During a Conflict
During a conflict, weaponized interdependence has direct implications for the United States and allies and partners’ operations. Through non-kinetic means, a near-peer rival can compel kinetic outcomes and cause a loss of capabilities.
For example, a country can disrupt another country’s supply of – or demand for – goods and services. Either can affect the warfighter by exerting pressure on that country to deny supplies for the warfighter and/or local population and pressuring the political leadership. Supplies can range from traditional goods (e.g., food products) to newer services (e.g., data servers).
Disrupting a country’s imports can have disastrous consequences. An embargo – such as a naval blockade – could halt all imports. Alternatively, a country can cause another pain by refusing to export specific, key commodities. The former is common in military history. The latter is a challenge in the era of globalization, where an individual country can control key nodes of production for certain goods (e.g., rare earth minerals, microchips). For example, in April 2025, China imposed export restrictions on seven medium and heavy types of rare earth minerals, which requires firms to apply for a license to export rare earths. This has the potential to limit U.S. firms supply of these minerals and led the US Department of Commerce to launch a Section 232 investigation into the effects of critical minerals and their deliverable products on national security. Limiting access to rare earth minerals is not new behavior. In 2010, China temporarily halted the export of rare earth minerals to Japan after a Chinese fishing boat hit two Japanese coast guard vessels. In the following year, the price of rare earth minerals jumped 10x and since then Japan has sought to decrease its reliance on Chinese rare earth minerals, dropping from 90% to 60%. In a wartime situation, reliance on foreign goods can lead to scarcity and an inability to produce products critical to waging war. A lack of foreign goods could also put stress on the civilian population (e.g., lack of available foods) and ultimately harm a country’s economy. While the United States is building capacity to weather these changes, some allies and partner’s economies are more reliant on the whims of larger powers. For example, Philippines imports roughly 40% of its food supply and requires access to international markets to feed its population.
Weaponizing interdependence can also occur through boycotting a country’s goods, thereby decreasing their exports. This is especially true if an exporting country’s corporations rely on an adversary’s domestic markets. For example, after South Korea approved a US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system (THAAD) in 2017, China instituted a boycott against South Korean goods, which led to an estimated $7 billion in lost revenue. While South Korea weathered these storms, other US allies and partners are reliant on China as a key market for exports and may not be as resilient.
Implications
Whether impacting imports or export, a country holds power over another country to affect the civilian population’s way of life and potentially compel them to make choices that favor the aggressors. During wartime, economic compellence could make the cost of supporting the United States unbearable to an ally and partner. China has famously used economic compellence as a means to force countries to not recognize Taiwan, with only 11 countries currently recognize the island as an independent country. Similarly, China could use both its import and export muscle to force US partners to not support US operations (e.g., threaten a country with retaliation if it allows the US to use its airstrips). This would limit US forces’ geographic footprint with the potential to impede operations.
Additionally, an adversary could disrupt the production of defense-related goods. For example, Vietnam was China’s top export for finished steel products in 2023, utilizing over 8 million tons. Vietnam’s reliance on China will impact its own production of defense equipment should it ever be involved in a South China crisis against China. Moreover, defense goods are not limited to weapons. Given the new forms of warfare, defense goods could include computers, drones, and data centers – all of which are critical to fighting and winning and require a diverse set of supply inputs. While the United States is attempting to shore up its own domestic markets for defense goods through initiatives such as the Office of Strategic Capital (OSC), it also may find itself in trouble if its allies and partners are not able to build critical capabilities due to China’s influence.
The Role of the Department of Defense
What is the Department of Defense’s role in mitigating the impact of economic compellence during a conflict? First, the Department of Defense must plan for the potential impacts of economic compellence through war games and contingency planning. While these sound like problems for the US Trade Representative or Department of Commerce, they directly impact the ability of the US military to achieve its mission in a time of crisis. Second, after recognizing potential risks for the United States and allies and partners exposed to economic compellence, there is a need to shore up defense from import and export compellence. Practically, this means doubling down on the international mandate for groups like OSC to work across the private sector to evaluate risk. This would include not only primary supplier risk but also secondary supplier risk for key goods and services. Moreover, the Department of Defense should remain a voice at the table with its partners across the USG to illustrate how economic compellence has consequences for the warfighter during a conflict. The centrality of the economy is not just apparent in policy – it is true in modern conflict too. What is war but the continuation of policy by other means.
Emma Campell-Mohn
The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US Air Force, the US Department of Defense, or the US government.